'항공' 카테고리의 다른 글
| EA-50/RA-50 (0) | 2007.03.06 |
|---|---|
| F-16 Block 60-UAE (0) | 2007.03.04 |
| Boeing Win on A-10 Contract (0) | 2007.01.26 |
| Boeing cuts 787 wireless system (0) | 2007.01.25 |
| India buys cutting-edge Russian warplanes (0) | 2007.01.24 |
'항공'에 해당되는 글 27건
- 2007.01.30 KC-767,777 & KC-30
- 2007.01.26 Boeing Win on A-10 Contract
- 2007.01.25 Boeing cuts 787 wireless system
- 2007.01.24 India buys cutting-edge Russian warplanes
- 2007.01.23 the new M-346 advanced trainer aircraft near Mach 1
- 2007.01.19 Army to Develop Attack Helicopters
- 2007.01.08 Home-made fighter jet to add sky power(Jian-10) 1
- 2006.12.26 The year in review — and what's ahead
- 2006.12.20 대장금 도장 vs 연어 도장
- 2006.12.20 A380의 앞날이 막막해지다
Boeing Win on A-10 Contract Would Have $135 Million Impact on Georgia
Thursday January 25, 12:00 pm ET
"The Boeing A-10 program would manufacture the center wing panel structural assembly at our Macon facility if we win the A-10 contract. That work includes parts kitting, drilling, assembly and painting," said Curt Nothstine, director for Aircraft Sustainment and Modernization for Boeing's Maintenance, Modification and Upgrades business. "By placing the work in Macon, we can leverage the outstanding performance of the local workforce that we have seen on the C-17 program. We would expect to add new jobs by 2011."
The A-10 wing replacement program calls for the replacement wing sets to be delivered in parts and kitted for easy installation. The Air Force is expected to evaluate competitors on past performance, capability, total evaluated price and program schedule, before awarding the contract in Spring 2007.
"Our plan is to provide the Air Force with the skilled expertise and engineering know-how that will address the needs of the A-10 program with a low-risk, low-cost solution," continued Nothstine. "Using advanced lean manufacturing technologies, we will be able to provide a solution and assembly kit that will allow the A-10s to fly at least 20 more years. The outstanding past performance on the C-17 manufacturing work at the Macon facility provides Boeing with a strong base from which to compete for new work."
The contract is valued at up to $1.5 billion over two five-year periods. The company plans to announce Georgia-based suppliers within the month and anticipates similar financial gains in the states of Utah and Missouri.
The A-10 Thunderbolt II, first introduced in 1976, is a twin-engine jet aircraft designed for close air support of ground forces. The simple, effective and survivable single-seat aircraft can be used against all ground targets, including tanks and other armored vehicles.
A unit of The Boeing Company, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems is one of the world's largest space and defense businesses. Headquartered in St. Louis, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems is a $30.8 billion business. It provides network-centric system solutions to its global military, government and commercial customers. It is a leading provider of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems; the world's largest military aircraft manufacturer; the world's largest satellite manufacturer; a foremost developer of advanced concepts and technologies; a leading provider of space-based communications; the primary systems integrator for U.S. missile defense; NASA's largest contractor; and a global leader in sustainment solutions and launch services.
'항공' 카테고리의 다른 글
| F-16 Block 60-UAE (0) | 2007.03.04 |
|---|---|
| KC-767,777 & KC-30 (0) | 2007.01.30 |
| Boeing cuts 787 wireless system (0) | 2007.01.25 |
| India buys cutting-edge Russian warplanes (0) | 2007.01.24 |
| the new M-346 advanced trainer aircraft near Mach 1 (0) | 2007.01.23 |
International radio frequencies debate contributes to Boeing's
last-minute decision to dump wireless in-flight entertainment on 787
By Guy Norris
Boeing has unexpectedly ditched plans to fit leading-edge wireless in-flight entertainment (IFE) technology to the 787, but insists the move to the more conventional hard-wired replacement system will not impact either schedule or cost.
News of the change, which the company says was only firmly decided on in the second week of January, comes just two days after an industry analyst issued a disputed report saying some 787 customers had been told their aircraft deliveries could slide.
Boeing denies the Wachovia Capital Markets report and insists the schedule remains firm. Boeing says “there are no delivery delays in 2008 and we are still scheduled to meet entry-into-service in May 2008”.
The first flight remains on track for the end of August 2007.
Boeing’s 787 systems director Mike Sinnett says the “hard decision” to reject wireless IFE was made “because a couple of things converged on us”.
Boeing could not get 100% international confirmation from countries around the world to allocate frequencies in the IFE system’s 5GHz operating bandwidth. The frequency issue, he adds, was due to several countries requiring the bandwidth close to the IFE frequency for various air traffic, weather radar and military requirements. “We got 99% complete, but there are a couple of places in the world where those frequencies are already allocated to other uses.”
Concerns were also raised about the ability of the wireless chipset technology to use the same frequencies for multiple uses, and for it to keep pace with the expected growth in volume of seat-back content.
The IFE wires will now run to each seat through the adjacent seat track using similar housings developed for the power supply. “In the end we did not add a whole lot of weight. In fact, when we look at the antenna modules we had for each seat group, we end up with more than 45kg (100lb) of weight saved,” says Sinnett.
IFE suppliers Panasonic and Thales are adapting their respective systems to meet the change by developing floor distribution boxes in place of the original wireless access points. Sinnett adds airlines in the 787 working group were satisfied with the change once concerns of cabin re-configuration and quality were addressed.'항공' 카테고리의 다른 글
| KC-767,777 & KC-30 (0) | 2007.01.30 |
|---|---|
| Boeing Win on A-10 Contract (0) | 2007.01.26 |
| India buys cutting-edge Russian warplanes (0) | 2007.01.24 |
| the new M-346 advanced trainer aircraft near Mach 1 (0) | 2007.01.23 |
| Army to Develop Attack Helicopters (0) | 2007.01.19 |
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070124/59629022.html |
India buys cutting-edge Russian warplanes |
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MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Viktor Litovkin) - On January 22, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov arrived in Bangalore on his seventh visit to India.
That same day, high-level managers from the MiG Russian Aircraft Corporation demonstrated the multi-purpose Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-29KUB Fulcrum carrier-based fighter to Indian military experts at the Gromov Flight Research Institute in the town of Zhukovsky, outside Moscow.
This warplane, now undergoing flight tests, was developed especially for the Indian navy's aircraft carrier "Vikramaditya," formerly called the "Admiral Gorshkov," which was sold to India several years ago and is currently being upgraded at the Sevmash machine-building plant in Severodvinsk.
In all, the Indian navy is to receive 16 carrier-based fighters, including 12 single-seat MiG-29K warplanes and four two-seat MiG-29KUB fighter-trainers. Moreover, Russia would produce another 30 MiG-29K/MiG-29KUB aircraft if New Delhi confirms this order.
MiG is now completing two MiG-29Ks for subsequent certification tests and has launched production of 16 other similar warplanes at its plant in Lukhovitsy. This co-production arrangement involves several companies in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod and Ryazan, as well as a number of French, Indian and Israeli firms.
The MiG-29K/MiG-29KUB stole the show in Zhukovsky and thrilled members of India's military establishment, TV crews and journalists.
The Indian side is quite happy about the Russian warplanes its air force and navy are receiving under bilateral contracts.
"We have known about the top-class MiG warplanes for a long time, but the MiG-29KUB that was developed by Russia and India is even better," said Cdr. Jasvinder Chauhan, India's Air Force attache in Moscow.
This is no exaggeration because Indian experts helped develop this fighter along with MiG engineers and designers, listing all the required specifications. MiG held up its part of the bargain, coming up with an advanced aircraft whose specifications are probably better than those of any similar warplane.
Indian experts helped integrate foreign computers into the MiG-29KUB's avionics, took part in developing aircraft simulators and also chose its weaponry. Nikolai Buntin, who supervised the MiG-29K/MiG-29KUB project, said Russia's air force and navy still lack any similar aircraft.
This is an important feature of Russian-Indian military-technical cooperation. Moscow supplies only the most sophisticated military equipment to New Delhi and actively involves Indian experts in research and production projects. It also sells production licenses enabling India to assemble T-90S main battle tanks, Sukhoi Su-30MKI multi-role fighters and other weapons at its own companies.
BrahMos, a well-known Russian-Indian joint venture, turns out its eponymous supersonic anti-ship missiles for the Indian navy, air force and coastal-defense units.
Moscow and New Delhi have signed defense contracts worth $9 billion to date. Last year, Russian arms sales to India accounted for about 40% of its total arms exports of $5.2 billion.
Nevertheless, Sergei Ivanov has brought new proposals for the joint production of military equipment. For instance, Moscow has suggested making RD-33MK power plants for MiG-29K/MiG-29KUB warplanes at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. companies under a Russian license.
The Russian side would first like to supply the first 20 ready-made power plants. India, due to receive RD-33MK kits, will subsequently mass-produce their main units and components. In all, over 80 power plants worth $300 million will be assembled.
This is a very attractive offer because New Delhi plans to upgrade its operational MiG-29 fighters with RD-29 power plants, i.e. the initial RD-33MK version.
The RD-33MK has already been overhauled three times, and its rated power has increased twofold as a result. This more fuel-efficient power plant has cut hourly operational costs by 2.5 times. Moreover, its service life has been doubled. The Indian air force can therefore use the inexpensive and cost-effective RD-33MK to upgrade previously supplied planes.
The Russian and American press has repeatedly reported that India's old MiG-21 Fishbed fighters-interceptors, now featuring Russian-made Kopye (Spear) radars, defeated the more advanced and powerful U.S. Air Force F-16 warplanes in a mock dogfight.
The Indian air force has about 100 MiG-29 fighters, as well as 135 MiG-27 Flogger aircraft that can also be fitted with RD-33MK power plants.
On January 18, the Indian government approved the RD-33MK production contract, which can be signed by Sergei Ivanov or Russian President Vladimir Putin, due to arrive in New Delhi later this week.
However, this contract has another important aspect. The MiG-35 Fulcrum new-generation multi-purpose fighter, now taking part in the Indian air force's tender for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft program, will have the same RD-33MK power plant.
The MiG-35 is vying against the SAAB JAS-39 Gripen fighter and France's Mirage-2000 warplane. The Indian air force, which plans to acquire 126 multi-role fighters, will save money if it opts for the MiG-35, because production of RD-33MK power plants will be located in India. This option would be cheaper than purchasing Boeing or Lockheed-Martin aircraft.
The Indian government's commission on tenders will make the final decision. However, Indian experts and top military leaders will be able to see two fighters with RD-33MK power plants - the MiG-29MOVT with a vectored-thrust engine and the MiG-35 - at the Air India-2007 show, due to open in Bangalore in early February.
Russia's best aircraft are now flying to India.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
'항공' 카테고리의 다른 글
| Boeing Win on A-10 Contract (0) | 2007.01.26 |
|---|---|
| Boeing cuts 787 wireless system (0) | 2007.01.25 |
| the new M-346 advanced trainer aircraft near Mach 1 (0) | 2007.01.23 |
| Army to Develop Attack Helicopters (0) | 2007.01.19 |
| Home-made fighter jet to add sky power(Jian-10) (1) | 2007.01.08 |
| Alenia Aermacchi: the new M-346 advanced trainer aircraft near Mach 1 | |||
| (2007-01-22) | |||
| By: Finmeccanica Company | |||
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'항공' 카테고리의 다른 글
| Boeing cuts 787 wireless system (0) | 2007.01.25 |
|---|---|
| India buys cutting-edge Russian warplanes (0) | 2007.01.24 |
| Army to Develop Attack Helicopters (0) | 2007.01.19 |
| Home-made fighter jet to add sky power(Jian-10) (1) | 2007.01.08 |
| The year in review — and what's ahead (0) | 2006.12.26 |
| Army to Develop Attack Helicopters |
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 |
By Jung Sung-ki Staff Reporter The South Korean Army plans to launch a $6-billion arms procurement program to build about 270 advanced attack helicopters next year, in addition to the ongoing development of 245 utility helicopters. The plan is part of efforts to upgrade the Korean military’s defense readiness in preparation for its exercise of independent wartime command within five years, as well as to replace the Army’s aging 500MD light attack helicopters, Army officials said. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved the plan last June, according to sources. ``We aim to start the development project next year to produce high-tech attack helicopters with the introduction of foreign technologies,’’ an Army spokesman said, requesting not to be identified. ``The Army is in talks with the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) for details, including the deadline.’’ ``Most of the existing attack helicopters will be nearly 30 years old by 2010. So, we need to secure new, advanced helicopters to prepare for our increasing role in national defense,’’ the official said. The Army now has about 700 helicopters, but more than half are outdated. The Army wants to build a prototype helicopter in 2014 before beginning mass production of 272 units, he said, adding the total procurement amount is estimated at about 5 to 6 trillion won. Some defense experts said, however, the cost may double. Initially, the Army planned to develop 299 transport helicopters and 178 attack helicopters by 2010 under the Korea Multi-Purpose Helicopter (KMH) program. But the project was downscaled in May 2005 because civic groups and the state audit agency had raised questions over its economic feasibility. The Army said it would determine whether to build attack helicopters later depending on the success of the utility helicopter project, codenamed the Korean Helicopter Program (KHP). The KHP that started in December 2005 aims to deploy 245 advanced troop-carrying helicopters in the military beginning in 2012 with the investment of about 1.3 billion won for the research and development, and management of the sophisticated rotary-wing aircraft. The Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Eurocopter, a consortium from France and Germany, are in charge of the development and production of the transport helicopters. Seoul and Washington agreed last October to implement the transition of wartime operational control of the Korean troops from the U.S. military to the Korean commanders between 2009 and 2012 | ||
'항공' 카테고리의 다른 글
| India buys cutting-edge Russian warplanes (0) | 2007.01.24 |
|---|---|
| the new M-346 advanced trainer aircraft near Mach 1 (0) | 2007.01.23 |
| Home-made fighter jet to add sky power(Jian-10) (1) | 2007.01.08 |
| The year in review — and what's ahead (0) | 2006.12.26 |
| 대장금 도장 vs 연어 도장 (0) | 2006.12.20 |
Home-made fighter jet to add sky power
By Zhao Huanxin (China Daily/Xinhua)Updated: 2007-01-06 08:39
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"China has become the world's fourth country to develop its own advanced fighter planes, engines and missiles," AVIC I Vice-President Geng Ruguang said on Friday.
At a rare press conference held in Beijing, the AVIC I executive said the indigenously developed Jian-10, and the fourth-generation air-to-air missiles had been deployed in the air force.
Apart from the Jian-10, AVIC I has also developed the Taihang turbofan engine, heralding China's third generation military aero-engines, Geng said.
"With the goal of building a creative company, we have vigorously promoted innovation. As a result, a batch of aviation achievements have been made," Geng said.
The press meet followed a brief military announcement on December 29 that the air force of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had been equipped with the home-made, new-generation Jian-10, or Fighter-10.
The force's "overall battle effectiveness has been noticeably enhanced" with the equipment and through intensive drills and training, and the country's defense capability has improved further.
On Friday, Geng said Jian-10 had a multitude of new technology with multiple uses.
In a five-minute video clip shown to the media, the aircraft was seen flying in formation, firing missiles and refuelling in the air.
The AVIC I-affiliated Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corp in Southwest China's Sichuan Province started developing Jian-10 in 1986.
It has two models, a one-seater and a two-seater, said Yang Wei, chief of Jian-10's designer Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research Institute.
Besides those in Chengdu, at least 100,000 people from across more than 100 factories and institutes were involved in designing and making of Jian-10, said Liu Gaozhuo, former AVIC I president and a chief commander of the fighter aircraft.
"Jian-10 is comparable to the mainstream fighter planes of developed countries," Liu was quoted by the China Aviation News as saying on Friday "With its success we'll have a platform for developing later models of fighter aircraft."
Experts said China was becoming increasingly transparent with its military sector. The State Council Information Office released a White Paper on national defense on December 29, which said the air force was working on an "informationalized" air fighting force both with offensive and defensive capabilities.
Not the best, but still good
The home-grown new
generation fighter plane, Jian-10, may not rival the US fourth-generation
aircraft in performance, but its basic design and onboard equipment are
comparable to those of Western mainstream fighter aircraft, military observers
said.
Jian-10 will help the Chinese Air Force improve its defense capabilities and expedite weapon modernization.
Associated Press: Friday's public announcement reflects the government's and its developers' growing confidence in Jian-10, Asia Pacific bureau chief of Jane's Defense Weekly Robert Karniol said.
"It does represent some achievement on China's part. It reflects a growing sophistication," Karniol said.
The plane, however, has yet to prove its ability in combat, he said. Also, in the past China did not have much success with engine development, he said.
'항공' 카테고리의 다른 글
| the new M-346 advanced trainer aircraft near Mach 1 (0) | 2007.01.23 |
|---|---|
| Army to Develop Attack Helicopters (0) | 2007.01.19 |
| The year in review — and what's ahead (0) | 2006.12.26 |
| 대장금 도장 vs 연어 도장 (0) | 2006.12.20 |
| A380의 앞날이 막막해지다 (0) | 2006.12.20 |
2006
March: Stephen Udvar-Hazy, CEO of major aircraft lessor ILFC, says publicly that Airbus' A350 rival to Boeing's 787 isn't good enough.
June:
• Airbus announces a new six-month delay in delivery of its superjumbo A380.
• Boeing agrees to a $615 million settlement with the Justice Department, ending its punishment over major defense-contract-procurement scandals.
July:
• Airbus CEO Gustav Humbert and the head of parent company EADS, Noël Forgeard, both resign. Outsider Christian Streiff is appointed new Airbus CEO.
• At England's Farnborough Air Show, Airbus announces a revamped, wider-body A350, now matched against the 777 as well as the 787.
September:
• Airbus pushes the A380 program back another 10 months, stretching schedule delays to two years.
|
• Alan Mulally, CEO at Boeing's commercial division, leaves to head Ford. Top Boeing salesman Scott Carson replaces him.
• Boeing's first converted 747 Large Cargo Freighter flies into Seattle for flight tests prior to transporting pieces of the 787 around the globe.
October: New Airbus CEO Streiff resigns, severely criticizing the company's management structure.
December:
• Airbus launches the A350, with yet another revamp, including a composite plastic fuselage to match the 787. The airplane will be five years later than the 787.
• Lufthansa orders 20 new 747-8 passenger models, giving new life to Boeing's aging jumbo jet.
2007
January:
• The Air Force will release its final request for proposals on the long-delayed and contentious contract for air-refueling tankers, worth around $20 billion. Boeing competes against an Airbus airplane backed by Northrop Grumman.
• The Large Cargo Freighter begins ferrying 787 sections around the globe.
About April: Final assembly of the 787 begins in Everett.
Summer: The Air Force is scheduled to award the $20 billion contract for the air-refueling tanker.
End of June: Ceremonial rollout of the first 787.
End of August: First flight of the 787.
October: First delivery of the Airbus A380 superjumbo jet to Singapore Airlines.
2008
May: First delivery of the Boeing 787 to Japan's All Nippon Airways.
Copyright © 2006 The Seattle Times Company
'항공' 카테고리의 다른 글
| Army to Develop Attack Helicopters (0) | 2007.01.19 |
|---|---|
| Home-made fighter jet to add sky power(Jian-10) (1) | 2007.01.08 |
| 대장금 도장 vs 연어 도장 (0) | 2006.12.20 |
| A380의 앞날이 막막해지다 (0) | 2006.12.20 |
| P-3 CutAway (1) | 2006.12.18 |
인천-텐진 노선에 운행되는 아시아나 대장금 도장 항공기.
알래스카 항공의 연어 도장 항공기.
대장금
알래스카 항공의 연어 도장 항공기.
'항공' 카테고리의 다른 글
| Home-made fighter jet to add sky power(Jian-10) (1) | 2007.01.08 |
|---|---|
| The year in review — and what's ahead (0) | 2006.12.26 |
| A380의 앞날이 막막해지다 (0) | 2006.12.20 |
| P-3 CutAway (1) | 2006.12.18 |
| F-35 CutAway (0) | 2006.12.18 |
허허..팀블로거란게 이런거로군.
남의 블로그에 포스팅이 가능하다!
기념으로 1탄!
보잉을 꺽고 에어버스의 승리를 완전히 다지기 위한 필살기로 생각했던 A380이
거꾸로 에어버스를 찌르는 칼이 된건 아닌지....
신문기사에도 나오지만 (Chicago-based Boeing's big hit, the 787 Dreamliner) 지역 입장에서
크지 않은 문제를 심각한 듯 뻥튀기 한 기사인 듯한 논조도 보이긴 함.
항공기 장비간, 항공기간 통신의 문제 등 모든 문제는 결국 프랑스, 독일, 영국, 스페인이 공동 참여한 EADS라는 회사의 정치적인 문제라는 얘기.
민항기 분야에서 거의 보잉으로 통합된 미국 상황과 의도적인 비교로 보여진다.
시스템 통합의 문제를 애초에 정해두지 않아서 결국 후반부에 잘못 꼬인 매듭을 풀기가 더 힘들어 진것 같네.
애초에 A380 개발에 CATIA v5로 통일해서 적용하기로 했는데 독일 엔지니어들이 CATIA v4를 고집해서 지금 더욱 꼬여버렸다고 하네.
실패 경험이 가장 큰 기술 자산이라는 관점으로 본다면 EADS의 향후 프로젝트와 dassault CATIA 제품의 완성도가 더욱 높아지는 결과가 될수도 있을 듯.
워낙 잘살고 힘있는 고래들 싸움이니 우리같은 새우는 그 사이에서 끼지않고 떡고물 떨어지는 것만 지켜볼 밖에....
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0612170278dec17,0,61792.story?coll=chi-business-hed
By David Greising, Tribune chief business correspondent. Tribune staff reporter Julie Johnsson contributed to this report
Published December 17, 2006
남의 블로그에 포스팅이 가능하다!
기념으로 1탄!
보잉을 꺽고 에어버스의 승리를 완전히 다지기 위한 필살기로 생각했던 A380이
거꾸로 에어버스를 찌르는 칼이 된건 아닌지....
신문기사에도 나오지만 (Chicago-based Boeing's big hit, the 787 Dreamliner) 지역 입장에서
크지 않은 문제를 심각한 듯 뻥튀기 한 기사인 듯한 논조도 보이긴 함.
항공기 장비간, 항공기간 통신의 문제 등 모든 문제는 결국 프랑스, 독일, 영국, 스페인이 공동 참여한 EADS라는 회사의 정치적인 문제라는 얘기.
민항기 분야에서 거의 보잉으로 통합된 미국 상황과 의도적인 비교로 보여진다.
시스템 통합의 문제를 애초에 정해두지 않아서 결국 후반부에 잘못 꼬인 매듭을 풀기가 더 힘들어 진것 같네.
애초에 A380 개발에 CATIA v5로 통일해서 적용하기로 했는데 독일 엔지니어들이 CATIA v4를 고집해서 지금 더욱 꼬여버렸다고 하네.
실패 경험이 가장 큰 기술 자산이라는 관점으로 본다면 EADS의 향후 프로젝트와 dassault CATIA 제품의 완성도가 더욱 높아지는 결과가 될수도 있을 듯.
워낙 잘살고 힘있는 고래들 싸움이니 우리같은 새우는 그 사이에서 끼지않고 떡고물 떨어지는 것만 지켜볼 밖에....
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0612170278dec17,0,61792.story?coll=chi-business-hed
A380's troubles roiling Airbus
Long production delay costing customers, raising nationalistic rivalriesBy David Greising, Tribune chief business correspondent. Tribune staff reporter Julie Johnsson contributed to this report
Published December 17, 2006
HAMBURG, Germany --
In Airbus' sprawling production plant here, one of
modern industry's biggest meltdowns, and the dawning effort to set
things right, is a tale of two airplane-production hangars and two
countries, Germany and France.
Nearly 600 people should be hard at work in the key production hangar here, where Airbus planned to assemble the giant sections of the world's largest passenger airplane, the A380. Instead, the quiet is broken only by music playing softly on a stereo speakers that an employee sneaked in. Only a few dozen employees tinker on eight airplane carcasses that clog a production line that cost some $15 billion to develop.
The workers essentially are hand-building some of the company's first two dozen A380s. Airbus' superjumbo jet program was launched before Chicago-based Boeing's big hit, the 787 Dreamliner, but the A380 now is two years behind schedule, and the production delay will cost Airbus' parent company, European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co., $6.1 billion is operating profit over the next four years.
In Hangar 42 nearby, it is a different scene. Dozens of aerospace engineers are in a mad dash to untangle the A380's myriad of problems. They huddle in front of computer terminals, set up on 15-foot-long folding tables, so they can be in constant contact with workers in blue jumpsuits who are investigating a hobbled A380. The workers, confronted with bundles of wire that won't bend in the right places and cables that come up short, explain the problems to the engineers and urge them to design new ones. And quickly.
The design engineers are bogged down by computers that can't talk to one another. One displays their work in three-dimensional images, the other is strictly 2-D. The breakdown fouls the effort to design a new part, get it built and get the A380 back into full production.
The A380 line won't run full speed until 2010, if all goes well. Biding their time until then, thousands of workers are idle or on part-time shifts. Yet others labor furiously, redesigning parts and installing them as they arrive, all in the rush to get the A380 on track.
Workers in Hamburg and Airbus' other facilities have worried, hurried and waited since the planemaker in October announced that breakdowns on its A380 production line would put deliveries of the new plane two years behind schedule.
The production problems are especially tough to manage because the rest of Airbus' system is running full steam. The company will deliver a record number of smaller aircraft this year, 430, outdistancing archrival Boeing and topping 400 for the first time. In addition, the company last month announced it will launch a midsize aircraft, the A350, designed to compete with Boeing's hot-selling new 787.
But no matter how well the rest of the business might run, though, Airbus can't declare success as long as the A380's problems remain unsolved.
An examination of what has gone wrong with the A380 is a much broader issue than parts that don't fit and computer systems that can't communicate with one another. Indeed, corporate and European politics are as much to blame for Airbus problems as the breakdown between computer-design systems in France and Germany.
A bitter battle for control of EADS last summer came to a head when the A380's emerging crisis should have demanded top management's attention.
Cultural issues also are at play. Workers in France and Germany don't necessarily trust each other. French workers suspect the Germans covered up problems or ignored them in an effort to keep work for themselves.
To move forward, the company has had to work out labor agreements in both countries, and a massive reshuffling at the top of Airbus also has occurred.
Worse still, the euro's 50 percent rise since 2000 has gouged into Airbus' profit, primarily because airplanes are priced in weaker dollars.
At full production, Airbus hopes by 2010 to produce four of the massive A380s per month. But it will deliver only one next year and 13 in 2008. The reason: It will take years to redesign significant parts on the production process and move those planes clogging the line.
Tom Williams, head of production at Airbus, ticks off the immensity of the problem.
Paging through charts, diagrams and photographs marked "Airbus Confidential," Williams notes there are almost 1,200 functions to control the plane. That takes 98,000 wires and 40,000 connectors. The digital design system has 500,000 models, and all those must be kept in sync by mismatched computer-design systems.
Getting to the core of the problems will take more than industrial know-how.
"It will require trade-offs and sacrifices," Williams said. "There are things that make you say, from a pure industrialist's point of view, is that the simplest solution? Maybe not. But it has to work at a political level, as well."
Mired in politics
Politics have been part of Airbus from the time the company was founded in 1970 as an example of European cooperation and technological wizardry. And the A380 was supposed to be a crowning symbol of trans-European industrial glory.
Instead, as the Tribune found during the first visit by a reporter to the Airbus hangars since the company announced its latest setback, another one-year production delay, the A380 is becoming a symbol of monumental failure.
FedEx Corp. canceled its order and turned to Boeing. Virgin Airways put its order on hold. Lufthansa also ordered a freighter version of Boeing's 747 jumbo jet. The largest A380 buyer, Emirates Airline, sent auditors to Airbus' plants and blamed management for delays that are putting Emirates' aggressive growth strategy at risk.
The serial delays have caused some customers not to speak at all. That's the treatment that befell John Leahy, Airbus' top sales executive, when he and Williams toured world capitals in the days before the company announced the delay.
Their first stop was Singapore Airlines, which originally expected to receive the first A380 early this year. In June, Airbus already had announced its second six-month delay, and rumors of more production-line snafus were swirling when Leahy and Williams met Singapore Chief Executive Chew Choon Seng in his office to update him on the airline's order.
"You've heard all these rumors about what the delay might be," Leahy recalled saying. "I want to start out before we go on with the presentation, because you'll all just want to jump to the end. And the answer is, it's a 12-month delay."
Chew and his team just sat straight-faced. At last, Leahy needed to break the silence.
"Yes, 12 months," he said. "I'm sorry, but it's 12 months."
Chew then asked Leahy to finish his presentation.
"I just want to understand why," Chew said.
The trouble really began in 2000, as Airbus executives were working hard to resolve a controversial control dispute among its German, French, British and Spanish owners by consolidating into a company jointly run by co-CEOs from France and Germany.
The A380 was the first big project of the newly christened EADS. It had been conceived as one of the most ambitious undertakings of the Industrial Age. Nose sections would be built in France, fuselages in Germany, wings in Great Britain and tails in Spain. The city-state of Hamburg filled in acres of the River Elbe to allow Airbus to expand its plant. French taxpayers paid to widen roads and bridges so wings shipped from Wales could reach final assembly at corporate headquarters in Toulouse, France.
Then-Airbus CEO Noel Forgeard tried to unify operations by asking engineers in all the countries to work on a single design system. Dassault Systemes' Catia 5 is a cutting-edge workstation capable of delivering three-dimensional images of airplane parts. Those designs then can be entered into a central model of the plane known as the digital mock-up.
Engineers in Germany balked. They continued working on an earlier-generation Catia 4. But that system renders images only in two dimensions, risking a design mismatch. Worse yet, said Williams, the German engineers placed their work into the digital mock-up in ways that distorted results.
"We were just storing up a long-term problem," Williams said.
Those problems appeared in full bloom soon after the A380 migrated from the design phase into industrial production in mid-2004. Some wires were too short to connect the main fuselage section to the nose. Some were too thick and couldn't make the bends that the design system said they could.
For two years, Airbus downplayed the troubles. But by summer, the Frenchman Forgeard was forced out, and his German successor, Christian Streiff, fired the leader of the A380 program. Williams took over as head of all Airbus production. Days later, Airbus had another new CEO. Louis Gallois, an aerospace industry veteran who recently had run the French National Railways, would take on the job of fixing the A380 and restructuring Airbus.
Despite the turmoil, at least one key question was settled by the time Gallois took over. The production line would not be shut down altogether.
Streiff seriously considered that option. As he dug into the problems last summer, he learned that they went deeper than he had feared. Under pressure from directors at EADS, which had hired its own outside consultants, Streiff began to suspect a complete shutdown was the only solution, former colleagues say.
Leahy argued strenuously against a shutdown in a series of meetings. Once stopped, the line might not restart for two years. By then, many of the 166 firm orders from 15 customers would be gone, he warned.
"You've got some commitments out there guys," Leahy recalled saying. "We know we can build some. Let's just get some airplanes out the door."
Restructuring urged
With that issue settled, Gallois could take on more. In early October, he said the company soon would announce a new restructuring program, called Power8. Gallois would seek to find $2.7 billion in annual savings by 2010.
Three of the program's eight main initiatives remain unsettled: how to optimize Airbus' final assembly lines, how to increase the role of outside suppliers, and looking at whether the industrial structure of the company made sense.
In Hamburg, fear is widespread that Airbus will "optimize" the production lines by moving all A380 production to France. Streiff himself raised that possibility during a visit.
Airbus officials admit it is hard to defend, from a purely industrial standpoint, an Airbus system that builds a fuselage in Hamburg, ships it to Toulouse for attachment of the wings, nose and tail, and then returns it to Hamburg for cabin installation and painting.
Tim Clark, president of Emirates, has told Airbus he would like to see a major realignment that includes a reconsideration of the Hamburg setup.
"With a process review and a re-engineering of Airbus, I've said you could produce airplanes 20 percent to 30 percent cheaper if you realigned," he said.
Just a few days after Gallois took charge, though, he quietly sent a clear message to Hamburg's union leadership that appears intended to reduce anxiety about the plant's future. Horst Niehus, head of Airbus Germany's works council, was among Gallois' first visitors in the CEO's new office in Toulouse. When Niehus asked for assurances that Hamburg would maintain its role in A380 production, Gallois crafted a carefully worded answer.
"Everything has to be on the table," Niehus recalled Gallois saying. "But I know what it would mean to take something from Hamburg and give it to Toulouse."
Niehus interprets the statement as a promise that the A380 will stay in Hamburg.
Still, major restructuring is coming, and fears about Gallois' plans are dividing Airbus' unions. French union leaders blame the Germans for not addressing the A380's problems more aggressively right away.
"They wanted to hide it as long as they could. The Germans wanted to save German jobs," said Jean-Francois Knepper, leader of the powerful Force Ouvriere union at Toulouse and co-head of the European workers committee at Airbus.
The brunt of the restructuring should come in Germany, Knepper said.
"If Airbus is a tree, France has the thriving branches," he said. "If there are dead branches to be cut, they're not in France."
There are divisions inside the plants too. At Hamburg, the A320 line is running full speed, straining to keep pace with Airbus' record sales, even as A380 production is nearly halted.
Airbus has addressed the problem by cutting back production workers on the A380 line to 28 hours a week, yet giving them full pay. Once the A380 line moves to full production sometime next year, workers will even up by working overtime without extra pay.
Even down to 28 hours, there is not enough for workers to do. Dozens are sent each day to mop halls that are spotlessly clean. Hundreds have been moved to the A320 line, but they're not always welcomed.
"The A320 workers feel that everything is going just right, [and] the A380 workers just get in the way," Niehus said. Also, the A320 workers would be earning significant overtime if the A380 workers weren't there.
No such divisive issues have surfaced in Toulouse. More than 1,000 engineers from Hamburg, and nearly 3,000 visiting workers in all, are on site trying to fix the problems that the company's balky computer systems helped create.
Signs of the production breakdown are everywhere. One of the most obvious: An A380 parked at the edge of Toulouse's cavernous assembly hangar.
The plane should be on its way to Hamburg to have the passenger cabin assembled and the seats put in before heading to the paint bay. Instead, it is surrounded by scaffolding. From tip to tail and under the wings as well, workers make their way along the lattice structures, stringing wires by hand as fixes come in.
Andreas Fehring, a quality expert from Hamburg who came to help direct the A380 recovery effort in Toulouse, shows a visitor why there is more to fixing the problem than just stringing new wires. Every change must be documented, for starters. Changes must be entered into the airline's production records and into the A380 design module.
Wires can't just be run in and out. Many are hidden behind air-conditioning ducts and the like. Fehring points to an inch-thick bundle that snakes behind a large metal box.
"This is not just, `I pull one meter of wire out and put another meter of wire in,'" he said.
Fehring warns that no one should be misled by the relative quiet of the plant, and the fact that eight planes at Toulouse are sitting still, not moving through the production system as they should be.
"This is not a drag-your-feet program," Fehring said. "There is still pressure in the system."
----------
dgriesing@tribune.com
Nearly 600 people should be hard at work in the key production hangar here, where Airbus planned to assemble the giant sections of the world's largest passenger airplane, the A380. Instead, the quiet is broken only by music playing softly on a stereo speakers that an employee sneaked in. Only a few dozen employees tinker on eight airplane carcasses that clog a production line that cost some $15 billion to develop.
The workers essentially are hand-building some of the company's first two dozen A380s. Airbus' superjumbo jet program was launched before Chicago-based Boeing's big hit, the 787 Dreamliner, but the A380 now is two years behind schedule, and the production delay will cost Airbus' parent company, European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co., $6.1 billion is operating profit over the next four years.
In Hangar 42 nearby, it is a different scene. Dozens of aerospace engineers are in a mad dash to untangle the A380's myriad of problems. They huddle in front of computer terminals, set up on 15-foot-long folding tables, so they can be in constant contact with workers in blue jumpsuits who are investigating a hobbled A380. The workers, confronted with bundles of wire that won't bend in the right places and cables that come up short, explain the problems to the engineers and urge them to design new ones. And quickly.
The design engineers are bogged down by computers that can't talk to one another. One displays their work in three-dimensional images, the other is strictly 2-D. The breakdown fouls the effort to design a new part, get it built and get the A380 back into full production.
The A380 line won't run full speed until 2010, if all goes well. Biding their time until then, thousands of workers are idle or on part-time shifts. Yet others labor furiously, redesigning parts and installing them as they arrive, all in the rush to get the A380 on track.
Workers in Hamburg and Airbus' other facilities have worried, hurried and waited since the planemaker in October announced that breakdowns on its A380 production line would put deliveries of the new plane two years behind schedule.
The production problems are especially tough to manage because the rest of Airbus' system is running full steam. The company will deliver a record number of smaller aircraft this year, 430, outdistancing archrival Boeing and topping 400 for the first time. In addition, the company last month announced it will launch a midsize aircraft, the A350, designed to compete with Boeing's hot-selling new 787.
But no matter how well the rest of the business might run, though, Airbus can't declare success as long as the A380's problems remain unsolved.
An examination of what has gone wrong with the A380 is a much broader issue than parts that don't fit and computer systems that can't communicate with one another. Indeed, corporate and European politics are as much to blame for Airbus problems as the breakdown between computer-design systems in France and Germany.
A bitter battle for control of EADS last summer came to a head when the A380's emerging crisis should have demanded top management's attention.
Cultural issues also are at play. Workers in France and Germany don't necessarily trust each other. French workers suspect the Germans covered up problems or ignored them in an effort to keep work for themselves.
To move forward, the company has had to work out labor agreements in both countries, and a massive reshuffling at the top of Airbus also has occurred.
Worse still, the euro's 50 percent rise since 2000 has gouged into Airbus' profit, primarily because airplanes are priced in weaker dollars.
At full production, Airbus hopes by 2010 to produce four of the massive A380s per month. But it will deliver only one next year and 13 in 2008. The reason: It will take years to redesign significant parts on the production process and move those planes clogging the line.
Tom Williams, head of production at Airbus, ticks off the immensity of the problem.
Paging through charts, diagrams and photographs marked "Airbus Confidential," Williams notes there are almost 1,200 functions to control the plane. That takes 98,000 wires and 40,000 connectors. The digital design system has 500,000 models, and all those must be kept in sync by mismatched computer-design systems.
Getting to the core of the problems will take more than industrial know-how.
"It will require trade-offs and sacrifices," Williams said. "There are things that make you say, from a pure industrialist's point of view, is that the simplest solution? Maybe not. But it has to work at a political level, as well."
Mired in politics
Politics have been part of Airbus from the time the company was founded in 1970 as an example of European cooperation and technological wizardry. And the A380 was supposed to be a crowning symbol of trans-European industrial glory.
Instead, as the Tribune found during the first visit by a reporter to the Airbus hangars since the company announced its latest setback, another one-year production delay, the A380 is becoming a symbol of monumental failure.
FedEx Corp. canceled its order and turned to Boeing. Virgin Airways put its order on hold. Lufthansa also ordered a freighter version of Boeing's 747 jumbo jet. The largest A380 buyer, Emirates Airline, sent auditors to Airbus' plants and blamed management for delays that are putting Emirates' aggressive growth strategy at risk.
The serial delays have caused some customers not to speak at all. That's the treatment that befell John Leahy, Airbus' top sales executive, when he and Williams toured world capitals in the days before the company announced the delay.
Their first stop was Singapore Airlines, which originally expected to receive the first A380 early this year. In June, Airbus already had announced its second six-month delay, and rumors of more production-line snafus were swirling when Leahy and Williams met Singapore Chief Executive Chew Choon Seng in his office to update him on the airline's order.
"You've heard all these rumors about what the delay might be," Leahy recalled saying. "I want to start out before we go on with the presentation, because you'll all just want to jump to the end. And the answer is, it's a 12-month delay."
Chew and his team just sat straight-faced. At last, Leahy needed to break the silence.
"Yes, 12 months," he said. "I'm sorry, but it's 12 months."
Chew then asked Leahy to finish his presentation.
"I just want to understand why," Chew said.
The trouble really began in 2000, as Airbus executives were working hard to resolve a controversial control dispute among its German, French, British and Spanish owners by consolidating into a company jointly run by co-CEOs from France and Germany.
The A380 was the first big project of the newly christened EADS. It had been conceived as one of the most ambitious undertakings of the Industrial Age. Nose sections would be built in France, fuselages in Germany, wings in Great Britain and tails in Spain. The city-state of Hamburg filled in acres of the River Elbe to allow Airbus to expand its plant. French taxpayers paid to widen roads and bridges so wings shipped from Wales could reach final assembly at corporate headquarters in Toulouse, France.
Then-Airbus CEO Noel Forgeard tried to unify operations by asking engineers in all the countries to work on a single design system. Dassault Systemes' Catia 5 is a cutting-edge workstation capable of delivering three-dimensional images of airplane parts. Those designs then can be entered into a central model of the plane known as the digital mock-up.
Engineers in Germany balked. They continued working on an earlier-generation Catia 4. But that system renders images only in two dimensions, risking a design mismatch. Worse yet, said Williams, the German engineers placed their work into the digital mock-up in ways that distorted results.
"We were just storing up a long-term problem," Williams said.
Those problems appeared in full bloom soon after the A380 migrated from the design phase into industrial production in mid-2004. Some wires were too short to connect the main fuselage section to the nose. Some were too thick and couldn't make the bends that the design system said they could.
For two years, Airbus downplayed the troubles. But by summer, the Frenchman Forgeard was forced out, and his German successor, Christian Streiff, fired the leader of the A380 program. Williams took over as head of all Airbus production. Days later, Airbus had another new CEO. Louis Gallois, an aerospace industry veteran who recently had run the French National Railways, would take on the job of fixing the A380 and restructuring Airbus.
Despite the turmoil, at least one key question was settled by the time Gallois took over. The production line would not be shut down altogether.
Streiff seriously considered that option. As he dug into the problems last summer, he learned that they went deeper than he had feared. Under pressure from directors at EADS, which had hired its own outside consultants, Streiff began to suspect a complete shutdown was the only solution, former colleagues say.
Leahy argued strenuously against a shutdown in a series of meetings. Once stopped, the line might not restart for two years. By then, many of the 166 firm orders from 15 customers would be gone, he warned.
"You've got some commitments out there guys," Leahy recalled saying. "We know we can build some. Let's just get some airplanes out the door."
Restructuring urged
With that issue settled, Gallois could take on more. In early October, he said the company soon would announce a new restructuring program, called Power8. Gallois would seek to find $2.7 billion in annual savings by 2010.
Three of the program's eight main initiatives remain unsettled: how to optimize Airbus' final assembly lines, how to increase the role of outside suppliers, and looking at whether the industrial structure of the company made sense.
In Hamburg, fear is widespread that Airbus will "optimize" the production lines by moving all A380 production to France. Streiff himself raised that possibility during a visit.
Airbus officials admit it is hard to defend, from a purely industrial standpoint, an Airbus system that builds a fuselage in Hamburg, ships it to Toulouse for attachment of the wings, nose and tail, and then returns it to Hamburg for cabin installation and painting.
Tim Clark, president of Emirates, has told Airbus he would like to see a major realignment that includes a reconsideration of the Hamburg setup.
"With a process review and a re-engineering of Airbus, I've said you could produce airplanes 20 percent to 30 percent cheaper if you realigned," he said.
Just a few days after Gallois took charge, though, he quietly sent a clear message to Hamburg's union leadership that appears intended to reduce anxiety about the plant's future. Horst Niehus, head of Airbus Germany's works council, was among Gallois' first visitors in the CEO's new office in Toulouse. When Niehus asked for assurances that Hamburg would maintain its role in A380 production, Gallois crafted a carefully worded answer.
"Everything has to be on the table," Niehus recalled Gallois saying. "But I know what it would mean to take something from Hamburg and give it to Toulouse."
Niehus interprets the statement as a promise that the A380 will stay in Hamburg.
Still, major restructuring is coming, and fears about Gallois' plans are dividing Airbus' unions. French union leaders blame the Germans for not addressing the A380's problems more aggressively right away.
"They wanted to hide it as long as they could. The Germans wanted to save German jobs," said Jean-Francois Knepper, leader of the powerful Force Ouvriere union at Toulouse and co-head of the European workers committee at Airbus.
The brunt of the restructuring should come in Germany, Knepper said.
"If Airbus is a tree, France has the thriving branches," he said. "If there are dead branches to be cut, they're not in France."
There are divisions inside the plants too. At Hamburg, the A320 line is running full speed, straining to keep pace with Airbus' record sales, even as A380 production is nearly halted.
Airbus has addressed the problem by cutting back production workers on the A380 line to 28 hours a week, yet giving them full pay. Once the A380 line moves to full production sometime next year, workers will even up by working overtime without extra pay.
Even down to 28 hours, there is not enough for workers to do. Dozens are sent each day to mop halls that are spotlessly clean. Hundreds have been moved to the A320 line, but they're not always welcomed.
"The A320 workers feel that everything is going just right, [and] the A380 workers just get in the way," Niehus said. Also, the A320 workers would be earning significant overtime if the A380 workers weren't there.
No such divisive issues have surfaced in Toulouse. More than 1,000 engineers from Hamburg, and nearly 3,000 visiting workers in all, are on site trying to fix the problems that the company's balky computer systems helped create.
Signs of the production breakdown are everywhere. One of the most obvious: An A380 parked at the edge of Toulouse's cavernous assembly hangar.
The plane should be on its way to Hamburg to have the passenger cabin assembled and the seats put in before heading to the paint bay. Instead, it is surrounded by scaffolding. From tip to tail and under the wings as well, workers make their way along the lattice structures, stringing wires by hand as fixes come in.
Andreas Fehring, a quality expert from Hamburg who came to help direct the A380 recovery effort in Toulouse, shows a visitor why there is more to fixing the problem than just stringing new wires. Every change must be documented, for starters. Changes must be entered into the airline's production records and into the A380 design module.
Wires can't just be run in and out. Many are hidden behind air-conditioning ducts and the like. Fehring points to an inch-thick bundle that snakes behind a large metal box.
"This is not just, `I pull one meter of wire out and put another meter of wire in,'" he said.
Fehring warns that no one should be misled by the relative quiet of the plant, and the fact that eight planes at Toulouse are sitting still, not moving through the production system as they should be.
"This is not a drag-your-feet program," Fehring said. "There is still pressure in the system."
----------
dgriesing@tribune.com
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